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Abstract  
This paper studies the effect of child-care subsidies on maternal labour supply. In 
the Finnish child-care system, parents taking care of their children at home 
receive a relatively generous home-care allowance. I use variation arising from 
changes in the municipality-specific supplement to this allowance to identify the 
causal effect of subsidies on the labour force participation of parents. A 
municipal supplement creates plausibly exogenous variation in subsidies, since 
the opportunity to take them up depends on municipal-level rules, but not on 
changes in individual labour supply decisions. Moreover, a supplement policy 
affects labour supply in a transparent way since the amount of supplement one is 
eligible for does not depend on income. Robustness checks indicate that the 
results are not driven by policy endogeneity or residential sorting. I find a large 
negative effect on the labour force participation and income of mothers. 100 
euros higher supplement per month reduces the maternal labour supply by 3 per 
cent. The estimated effect is larger for higher-educated than for medium-
educated mothers. 
Key words: Labour supply of parents, child care subsidies, participation tax rate 
JEL classification numbers: H2, J13, J22 
 
Tiivistelmä  
Tämä artikkeli tutkii kuinka paljon vanhemmille annettu tuki vaikuttaa heidän 
työn tarjontapäätöksiinsä. Suomessa pienten lasten äidit ovat oikeutettuja 
saamaan kotihoidontukea, jos he hoitavat lastaan itse kotona. Kotihoidontuen 
kuntalisä tarjoaa vanhempien työn tarjontapäätöksistä riippumatonta vaihtelua 
tukien suuruuksissa. Kuntalisissä on paljon ajallista ja alueellista vaihtelua, mikä 
mahdollistaa luotettavan kausaalipäätelmän tekemisen tukien vaikutuksista työn 
tarjontapäätöksiin. Lisäksi kuntalisä ei useimmissa tapauksissa riipu vanhempien 
  
 
tuloista. Kotihoidontuen havaitaan vaikuttavan suhteellisen paljon vanhempien 
työn tarjontaan. Jos kotihoidontukea korotetaan 100 eurolla kuukaudessa, 
pienentää se tulosten mukaan äitien työllisyyttä noin 3 prosentilla. Yllättäen 
enemmän koulutetut reagoivat herkemmin työn tarjonnan kannusteisiin kuin 
hieman vähemmän koulutetut äidit. 
Asiasanat: Lasten hoidon tuki, vanhempien työn tarjonta, osallistumisvero 
JEL-luokittelu: H2, J13, J22 
 
1 Introduction
A key question faced by most industrialized countries concerns policy measures
aimed at increasing labour supply. With ageing populations, a smaller workforce
will have to provide for a larger retired share of the population. At the same time
it has proved diﬃcult to extend working lives through changes in retirement poli-
cies (Lindbeck and Persson (2003) and OECD (2009)). This has led to increased
attention towards the study of labour supply decisions in diﬀerent phases of work-
ing age. One important gap in working lives occurs when parents have children.
Mothers in particular may not participate in the labour force for many years after
they give birth.
This paper studies the impact of child-care subsidies on maternal labour sup-
ply. In the Finnish day-care system, a relatively generous home-care allowance
is given to parents who stay at home to take care of their children. This subsidy
clearly increases incentives to stay outside of the labour force for prolonged periods.
Changes in a municipal supplement to this allowance provide exogenous variation
in the labour supply incentives of parents. A parent is eligible for a supplement
based on the municipality she lives in and the age of her youngest child. On the
contrary, other characteristics of a parent do not aﬀect the amount of supplement
he or she is eligible for. Therefore the variation in supplements is exogenous to
labour supply incentives of individuals.
A municipal supplement to the home-care allowance provides a good case of a
regional experimental set-up. There are no other regionally varying policies that
aﬀect mothers of young children in Finland. Moreover, a municipality might oﬀer
a supplement simply because it is viewed that mothers should take care of their
own children. In this case the decision to implement a supplement policy would
not depend on the municipal employment situation. There is, however, a worry
that a supplement policy could in some way depend on economic conditions of the
municipality and therefore on the labour supply of parents. After presenting the
estimation approach, I discuss institutional reasons and empirical evidence showing
that policy endogeneity does not cause a threat to the identiﬁcation strategy.
The main results show that increasing the supplement has signiﬁcant negative
labour supply and earned income eﬀects. The estimated eﬀect indicates that 3 per
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cent fewer mothers participate to the labour force when a supplement is increased
by 100 euros per month. Surprisingly, I ﬁnd a larger eﬀect for higher-educated
than for lower-educated mothers. To put these reduced-form estimates into a
policy context, I estimate participation elasticity using exogenous variation as an
instrument. The results indicate a participation elasticity of 0.8 for all mothers.
These ﬁndings survive a battery of sensitivity and robustness checks. I study the
labour force participation of fathers as well, but do not ﬁnd any eﬀect on their
labour supply.
In comparison with previous studies, a municipal supplement provides several
attractive features for studying the labour supply eﬀects of a policy. Having many
treatment and control regions allows me to compare very similar people with each
other. For example, Eissa and Liebman (1996) compared mothers and women
without children and Blundell et al. (1998) compared women across education
levels and cohorts, although it is reasonable to assume that these groups behave in
diﬀerent ways. In addition, municipalities have changed their supplement policies
on several occasions. The multiple reforms introduced at diﬀerent points in time
help to distinguish the treatment eﬀect from common macro shocks to treatment
or control group. This would not be the case if the reforms were enacted simul-
taneously or if there was only one treated group (Schone (2004) and Baker et al.
(2008)).
In the quasilinear-utility form consumption function set-up, that e.g Saez (2002)
uses, the decision to participate depends on the relative diﬀerence in after-tax in-
come when working and when not. There can be variation in both, income when
working and when not. Most previous studies (e.g. Baker et al. (2008), Milligan
and Stabile (2007) and Lundin et al. (2008)) utilize exogenous variation in the
after-tax income when working. On the other hand, a municipal supplement aﬀects
the after-tax income when not working. This makes analysis more reliable because
the variation in subsidies aﬀects participation incentives of everyone instead of just
those in a speciﬁc part of income distribution.
Using this feature, a municipal supplement allows me to estimate a participa-
tion elasticity. To estimate the participation elasticity, the income associated with
the counterfactual participation status needs to be simulated for everybody in the
sample. The municipal supplement is used as an instrument for the change in after-
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tax income simulated for everybody. The amount of supplement one is eligible for
does not depend on family income. Consequently, the municipal supplement is a
good instrument for the income diﬀerence. The resulting IV estimate, the partic-
ipation elasticity, can be used in tax simulations analysing the optimality of tax
systems (Saez (2001), Saez (2002) and Immervoll et al. (2007)). The estimated
participation elasticity of 0.8 is higher than that used in many simulations.
Because the supplement aﬀects individuals in all parts of the income distribu-
tion equally when they do not work, it is possible to analyse how parents from
diﬀerent parts of income distribution react to changes in taxation. Although the
counterfactual income is by deﬁnition missing, the education of everyone is known.
Education is a good proxy for income. Thus the divided sample results by edu-
cation are used to estimate the eﬀect taxes have across income distribution. This
is interesting since many earlier papers analysed policies where most of the varia-
tion in labour supply incentives aﬀected the lower end of income distribution (e.g.
Eissa and Liebman (1996) and Milligan and Stabile (2007)), with the exception
of Eissa (1995). I ﬁnd a u-shape in response proﬁle by education. The result
that high-educated mothers respond more to changes in taxation than medium-
educated mothers is interesting. It also bears relevance to the optimal income tax
simulations mentioned above. The participation elasticity proﬁle across education
levels is something that earlier literature has not been able to produce.
This study also adds to the literature estimating the labour supply eﬀects of
child-care policies. These policies range from lowered day-care prices (Lundin et al.
(2008), Baker et al. (2008) and Lefebvre and Merrigan (2008)) to the employment
responses of maternity leave (Baker et al. (2008b)) and other child-care services
(Fitzpatrick (2010)) to child-care-related beneﬁts (Milligan and Stabile (2007))1.
A typical ﬁnding is that policies have some eﬀect, although not in all cases2.
1Milligan and Stabile (2007) studied the National Child Beneﬁt reform in Canada. With
province-level reforms, the variation that they observed does not arise from a single treated
group, a problem in many of the articles cited above. Their results indicate an elasticity of 0.96
from having earnings as a major source of income, which is comparable to what I ﬁnd.
2Lundin et al. (2008) do not ﬁnd any employment eﬀect from a Swedish reform that put a
cap on child-care prices. Similarly, Havnes and Mogstad (2009) do not ﬁnd that a Norwegian
day-care reform had any eﬀect on maternal labour supply. This is interesting, since the Swedish
and Norwegian child-care institutions are similar to those in Finland, except that Finland has a
signiﬁcant home care-allowance system.
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The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, I present the source
of the variation in child-care subsidies. I also provide a short description of the
Finnish child-care system. The identiﬁcation issues and the econometric speciﬁca-
tion are discussed in section 3. In section 4, there is a description of the data-set
and the descriptive statistics. The estimation results and some robustness checks
are given in section 5. A discussion of the economic interpretation of the results
and an estimation of participation elasticity are presented in section 6. Section
7 discusses the economic policy implications of a supplement. The last section
concludes the study. The appendices contain the tables and ﬁgures referred to in
the text.
2 Forms of child care
Child care can be structured in many ways. To understand the particular features
of the Finnish institutions, I ﬁrst compare these to the arrangements in other
countries. I then describe the Finnish day-care system in more detail and discuss
how the institutions result in exogenous variation in the parents’ incentives to
supply labour.
How is Finland doing compared to other countries?
The Nordic countries provide extensive public day care, subsidized private day care
and parental leave policies. Children are entitled to a place in a public day-care
centre. The price for day care is heavily subsidized by the government. In Anglo-
Saxon and central European countries day care relies more on private providers.
The price a household ends up paying for day care can be much higher than in
the Nordic countries. Parental leave policies are provided in the Nordic countries
for parents whose youngest child is under one year old (with national variation).
This is much more than in the other OECD countries in general. In Finland the
home-care allowance continues for as long as two years after the end of maternity
leave. The home-care allowance works in a similar way to parental leave: one
has the right to return to one’s previous work place after the leave and there is a
subsidy from the government to the parent.
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A key feature that countries try to inﬂuence through their child-care institu-
tions is the employment rate of mothers. Figure A1 presents maternal employment
rates by the age of the youngest child in selected countries in 2005. It is evident
that the Nordic countries have higher employment rates than the OECD countries
on average.
The ﬁrst column in ﬁgure A1 shows the employment rate of mothers whose
youngest child is under 3 years old. This column stands out for Finland even
compared to the other Nordic countries. In contrast to Sweden and Denmark,
Finland provides a home-care allowance for this group. I hypothesize that the
Finnish home-care allowance system has an eﬀect on the labour supply of parents.
When mothers are no longer eligible for this allowance, their employment rate
shoots back to the high level seen in the other columns in ﬁgure A1.
Finnish day care
The idea of the Finnish child-care system has been to provide ﬁnancial assistance
to parents regardless of the choice a parent makes. After maternity leave (when
the newborn child is 10 months old), parents can choose essentially between three
child-care alternatives, all of which are ﬁnancially subsidized by the government:
home care, public day care or private day care.
Public day care is the predominant choice in Finland for a typical family. Every
child under the age of 7 (when they start primary school) is entitled to a public
day-care place if they request it3. A child can be placed in public day care even if
neither of the parents are in work. Day-care fees are regulated by the government
- a typical family with two children in public day care paid 380 euros in day-
care fees per month in 2005. Private day care is also subsidized4. Furthermore,
municipalities are able to pay a municipal supplement on top of the private day-
care allowance if they choose to. Majority of tax revenue is collected by central
government and part of tax revenue is collected by municipalities directly. Central
3This is stated in legislation. Before 1995 the law stated that every child under the age of 4
is entitled to public day care.
4This system has been in place nationwide since 1997. Between 1995 and 1997 there was an
experiment in 33 municipalities that provided a similar allowance. Viitanen (2007) describes this
experiment in detail. She found a positive eﬀect on the use of private day care, but little eﬀect
on labour force participation.
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government then redistributes tax revenues to municipalities using government
grants. Thus municipal budgets are partly determined by decisions of central
government and the extent and quality of services that municipalities need to oﬀer
to citizens is controlled by national legislation.
This study focuses on the employment eﬀect of the home-care allowance and a
supplement to it. Thus, the question of interest is not whether a family chooses pri-
vate or public day care. These two choices are similar in terms of the employment
decision.
When a child under 3 years of age is cared for by a parent, he or she is entitled
to the child home-care allowance (HCA). This national allowance can be paid
until the youngest child not in public or private day care reaches the age of 3. The
amount depends on the family’s characteristics and is from 300 to 500 euros per
month. The child home-care allowance may be paid to either parent, although it
is predominantly the mother who takes up the allowance. If a parent receives the
HCA, the same family can’t receive other forms of child care support (public or
private day care) for the same child. Thus this feature rules out the use of HCA
for ﬁnancing private day care5.
A municipal supplement to the HCA constitutes an interesting variation in this
study. Some municipalities pay a supplement on top of the national HCA while
other municipalities have no supplement policy. The municipal supplement has
been part of the Finnish child-care system since the 1980’s. The observation period
reaches from 1995 to 2005. Over this period, there were around 450 municipalities
in Finland. Five of them had adopted a supplement policy in 1995 and the ﬁgure
had increased to 65 by 2005. Figure A2 shows how the municipal supplement
has spread over time and ﬁgure A3 shows the population in 2005 on the map
of Finland. Clearly the group oﬀering a supplement contains bigger cities than
the group that does not, but there are cities in the group that does not have the
supplement policy.
A parent in work faces diﬀerent fee and subsidy schemes than a parent not in
work. A formula below describes the fees and subsidies when a parent is in work
(Iwork) and when not (INotwork):
5Which is supported by a diﬀerent allowance, private-care allowance.
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Iwork = Earned(I) − DC(I) (1)
INotwork = HCA(I) ∗ 1(chage < 3) + S ∗ 1(m = 1, chage < 3, other) (2)
where Earned refers to earned income net of tax, DC to day care fees, HCA
to home-care allowance, S to the supplement to it and chage to the age of the
youngest child in household. The I in parentheses indicates that the fee or subsidy
is a function of personal or family income. The eligibility for the supplement
depends on municipal level rules, but not on income (in most cases).
Although there are strict national rules about how municipalities have to pro-
vide child care, municipalities may choose their supplement policies relatively
freely. Thus there is a lot of variation in the details of how each municipality
pays its supplement. Typically a municipal supplement is paid per child. It is pos-
sible to receive an extra supplement if the youngest child has older siblings. The
mean monthly supplement level in the data is 200 euros and the mean sibling-extra
supplement is 50 euros per family. With the exception of a few municipalities, the
municipal supplement does not depend on family income. There is also a prior-
work condition in some smaller municipalities, according to which to be entitled
to the municipal supplement the parent must have worked prior to the parental
leave.
Why do municipalities pay supplements to the home-care allowance? The lit-
erature does not say much about the reasons. Typically municipal councils use
assessments made by municipal civil servants to indicate what would happen if
a supplement is implemented in municipality. These assessments typically com-
pare the costs arising from public day care with the costs of the HCA taking the
potential supplement into account.
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3 Identiﬁcation and econometric strategy
To estimate the eﬀect of a municipal supplement on maternal outcomes, I apply a
diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences (DD) and a triple diﬀerence approach. In the DD strategy
I compare outcomes for mothers living in diﬀerent municipalities before and after
there was a change in supplement policy. Mothers living in a municipality that
did not change its supplement policy comprise the control group. A supplement
policy is measured as the actual supplement a mother is eligible for based on her
observable characteristics. Thus it is not a dummy variable as in the basic DD
approach. The model is estimated for mothers with children in the home-care
allowance eligible age, when the child is between 9 months and 3 years old. In
the triple-diﬀerence estimation the third diﬀerence is whether or not the youngest
child is under 3 years old. This distinction is meaningful, since the upper age limit
for the youngest child to receive a supplement is 3 years old. I estimate the OLS
equation:
Yiym = α + β1Piym + β2Xiym + β3Munm + β4Y eary +  iym (3)
The dependent variable is labour supply or earned income, Y . In the labour
supply case it is a dummy variable with a value of 1 when a parent participates and
zero otherwise and in the earned income case it is a continuous variable. The key
explanatory variable is P (eligibility to municipal supplement). The model identi-
ﬁes β1, the eﬀect of a subsidy Piym on labour supply Yiym in year y, municipality
m and for individual i. In the case of labour supply, β1 shows the change in prob-
ability of a parent supplying labour when P is increased by one unit. The other
variables in equation (3) are the municipal (Munm) and year (Y eary) dummies
and a control vector (Xiym). When estimating the triple diﬀerence, the control
vector includes the interaction terms of the dummies used in the DD approach.
Any change in P is allocated to a simultaneous change in Y . The only reason for
a change in Y should be that there is a change in P , conditional on the covariates.
Since P varies in the municipality and year dimensions, the identiﬁcation relies on
municipal and year-level changes. That is why the controls include municipal-level
variables such as average unemployment rate and share of children in day care rel-
ative to the number of children in a municipality. The control vector also includes
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individual-level variables to take into account the individual-level variation. This
should reduce variation in the error term.
Changes in a municipality’s supplement rules depend on the age of the youngest
child. Simultaneously a mother’s decision to return to work is correlated with the
age of the youngest child. Consequently, β1 would be biased away from zero if this
correlation were not taken into account. Municipal supplement rules regarding
the youngest child’s age vary considerably. In some cases the upper age limit for
eligibility is raised gradually from 1 year and 2 months to 2 years. Thus to be able
to control for this variation in a ﬂexible way, I needed to include dummies for the
age of the youngest child. In the main estimates, a dummy for each 3 months of
age of the youngest child controls for all the unwanted correlation between policy
rules and child’s age. Other speciﬁcations for the length of the age interval in the
dummy produce similar results as in the main estimates.
Identiﬁcation issues
The DD approach identiﬁes a causal eﬀect of the municipal supplement on outcome
Y provided that certain assumptions hold. I use the standard DD assumption that
selection into treatment should be exogenous to outcome. In particular, the model
identiﬁes β1 conditional on controls if the following condition holds:
E[Y 0iym|m, y, Piym, Xiym] = E[Y 0iym|m, y,Xiym] =  m + y + β1Xiym (4)
where I note the outcome of the control group by Y 0iym. The assumption that
guarantees the identiﬁcation here is that Piym (eligibility to supplement) is exoge-
nous to Y 0iym (labour supply). Also, the average employment time trends need to
be parallel between the treatment and control groups. It seems reasonable that
mothers within a municipality do not self select into treatment, since the munici-
pal supplement is oﬀered to everyone living in a municipality with children of the
correct age. There would be a problem with identiﬁcation if changes in a sup-
plement would induce mothers to be more fertile. It seems unlikely that changes
in fertility is a problem from the identiﬁcation point if view, since a change in
supplement potentially aﬀects employment during current year. Potential increase
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in fertility, in turn, would lead to increased number of 1 year old children two
years from the change in supplement. Finally, the composition of the treatment
and control groups needs to be similar; it would be problematic if parents move
from one municipality to another based on changes in supplement policy. This
is unlikely since there are ﬁxed costs to moving outweighing potential gains from
extra supplement, and furthermore spouses are tied to their current job. After
the estimation results, I present some robustness checks as a defense against these
potential problems.
"How Much Should We Trust Diﬀerences-in-Diﬀerences Estimates" is a question
raised by Bertrand et al. (2004). Their simulations show that potential problems
with inconsistent standard errors are less severe if there are many treated and
control groups and the reforms are implemented at diﬀerent points of time. One
virtue of analysing the Finnish home-care allowance system is that there are over
400 municipalities, 65 of which had supplement policies in 2005. In addition, the
reforms were implemented at diﬀerent points of time.
Policy endogeneity
One potential problem here is policy endogeneity, as discussed by Card and Levine
(2000) and Lalive and Zweimuller (2004). The main worry is that a shock to munic-
ipal economy leads to a change in supplement rules. For instance, if a municipality
reacts to a recession by increasing the supplement, it might appear that the sup-
plement has an eﬀect on, say, employment, when in reality there is no causal eﬀect.
Fortunately for the identiﬁcation, there are institutional reasons dampening this
worry and empirical evidence against policy endogeneity hypothesis.
Municipal councils usually make the decision to implement a supplement based
on assessment made by municipal civil servants. The assessment typically includes
calculations about ﬁnancial situation of the municipality, how many children would
be aﬀected by the new policy and how large the costs of the new policy are to
the public day care in the municipality. After having the report, the municipal
council deals with the proposal and if it is approved, the municipal government
makes the ﬁnal decision in their meeting. This whole process takes time and the
civil servants inﬂuence the decision implying that quick changes based on sudden
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shocks or political desires are not likely to cause sudden changes in supplement
policies. The identiﬁcation in this paper relies on the eﬀects of sudden changes in
municipal policy on changes in employment. Thus the slow decision process is a
defense against policy endogeneity. An economic shock that aﬀects employment in
a municipality is unlikely to aﬀect the supplement policy quickly. On the contrary,
a change in municipal supplement is likely to aﬀect the employment of the target
group on the same period the reform happens. Political economy considerations
are dampened by the inﬂuence of civil servants to the decision process. Changes
that are not possible within a given budget period are less likely to be implemented
than if the decisions were entirely on the hands of elected municipal councils.
As to why municipalities want to implement supplement policies, it seems
the main reasons are attempting to reduce the number of children in public day
care and having an image of child-friendly municipality. This reasoning still does
not guarantee that the policy endogeneity regarding employment is not present.
Therefore, as a further evidence against policy endogeneity hypothesis, I describe
below how municipal level data behaves prior to implementing a supplement policy.
Figure A4 and table A1 presents coeﬃcients from a ﬁxed-eﬀects regression on
municipal-level data where indicator of implementation of supplement to home
care allowance (1(implem)) explains number of dependent variables (Ytm) in year
t and municipality m. The regression model used is:
Ytm = αm + β−21(implemt−2,m) + β−11(implemt−1,m) + β01(implemt,m)
+β11(implemt+1,m) + β21(implemt+2,m) + X ′tmζ + tm
I have included leads and lags of the implementation indicator variable (1(implemt−2,m)
- 1(implemt+2,m)) and year ﬁxed eﬀects and in applicable cases number of children
as covariates (X ′tm). Shocks to dependent variables prior to implementation of the
supplement would be evidence of policy endogeneity. The identiﬁcation strategy
used in the micro-level analysis uses municipal-level ﬁxed eﬀects. Therefore level
diﬀerences between municipalities do not endanger identiﬁcation.
The ﬁrst dependent variable in the table and the ﬁgure is the amount of re-
sources in euros a municipality uses to the supplement. The idea of this variable is
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to show that the supplement policy rules aﬀect the dependent variable when they
should. Figure A4 shows results of three other variables that are relevant from
the policy endogeneity point of view: Number of babies (aged 0 or 1 years), net
costs of municipality in all local government activities and the employment rate
of women. The important fact to take away from the ﬁgure is that there is no
signiﬁcant variation in coeﬃcients of leads and lags of the implementation variable.
The stable coeﬃcients indicate that a municipal supplement was not implemented
in response to a sudden change in economic conditions described by these three
outcomes.
Women are a relevant group as a potential future treatment group, therefore
their employment rate describes important economic conditions for the analysis.
Majority of women are not mothers of 1-2 years old children in any one point of
time. Thus women are much larger group than mothers with small children.
Table A1 shows leads and lags from regressions with other dependent vari-
ables: in column (2) cost of child care to municipality in log euros, in column (3)
the logarithm of number of children in private care, in column (4) the logarithm of
number of children receiving the home care allowance, in column (5) employment
rate and in column (6) the logarithm of migration to a municipality. The evidence
against policy endogeneity in these results is that there does not seem to be sig-
niﬁcant variation in coeﬃcients prior to implementation of the supplement. More
rigorous robustness tests are performed with micro data after the main estimation
results. The number of children receiving the home-care allowance is likely to be
aﬀected by implementation of the supplement to it, if the supplement policy is to
have any take-up. Indeed there is slight increase in this variable one year after the
municipality implements the supplement.
4 Data and descriptive statistics
The main data set in this study is individual-level micro data for the years 1994
to 2005. The data come from multiple sources. The base data, Income Distribu-
tion Statistics (IDS), come from Statistics Finland and are individual-level data,
containing over 25,000 observations from about 10,000 households per year from a
population of about 5 million Finns. The main estimation sample includes families
12
whose youngest child is between 9 months and 3 years old. Pooled for all years,
there are about 6,000 households in this group and about 14,000 households that
have children under the age of 6. The data contain a rich set of variables describing
family characteristics, demographics, incomes and beneﬁts derived from registers
and surveys. The rest of the information is at the municipal level and has been
linked to IDS data. It comes from a survey of municipalities conducted by the
University of Turku, a survey of municipalities conducted by the author, from the
Social Insurance Institution of Finland and from Statistics Finland. The data are
a repeated cross section at the individual level, although there is a rotating panel
system6. Aggregated to the municipal level, the data constitute a panel where
each municipality can be followed over the years.
Table A2 shows descriptive statistics. It categorizes mothers according to the
age of their youngest child. Mothers in the main estimation sample, shown in the
ﬁrst column, are on average 32 years old and have at least high school education
almost 50 per cent of the time. The most typical families are those with one or
two children, but there are also larger families in the data.
The main outcome variables are employment status and earned income of a
parent that comes from tax registers measured as a sum for the whole calendar
year. I construct the employment status using earned income of a parent and a
threshold level derived from the earned income of everyone in the data. I deﬁne
mothers as employed when their annual earned income is higher than half of the
mean income for women in labour force in the data7. The choice of the threshold
is somewhat arbitrary. However, it is important to note, that the results are not
sensitive for the precise selection of employment threshold. This is discussed in
more detail in robustness checks after the main estimation results. Putting the
employment threshold to zero would not be a good measure of employment. In this
case someone who works just one day in the very end of year would be categorized
as employed although practically she has not worked in that year.
Figure A5 shows the actual earned income distribution in the main estima-
6In rotating panel each household is surveyed in two consecutive years and each year half of
the sample consists of new households. Thus there are two consecutive observations for each
individual.
7More speciﬁcally I have measured income from women who are between 20 and 59 years old
and not being in sick leave, retired or other ways outside of the labour force.
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tion sample divided into three education categories: low-8, medium-9 and high-
education group10 . It is evident that there are a lot of mothers not working
during the whole calendar year in all groups. The threshold for participating
varies by the education categories and by year. For low educated, the typical
mean income calculated for women in the labour force is 15000€ per year, leading
to employment threshold of 7500€ per year. For the high education category the
typical mean income is 25000€ per year leading to employment threshold of less
than 13000€ per year. According to Statistics Finland (2011) a woman in full-time
employment earned in 2008 about 2500€ per month. This illustrates that someone
earning around 10000€ per year could not have been in full time employment the
whole year.
The explanatory variable in the main estimations is a supplement to the home-
care allowance. The amount of supplement one is eligible for is imputed to everyone
in the sample using observable characteristics (family size, age of children and mu-
nicipality they live in) and based on the eligibility rules. These rules are described
in section 2. The main variation in the rules is by the amount of supplement and
age limit of the youngest child after which one is no longer eligible for it.
The home-care allowance, day-care fees and family income are implemented for
everyone in the data according to policy rules using the estimated income associ-
ated with full-time working and family characteristics. In estimating participation
elasticity, the net diﬀerence of these variables deﬁnes the change in after-tax in-
comes associated with entry. To make income uncorrelated with actual working
status, it is imputed for those not being in work based on observable characteristics
and the incomes of those who are in work. Two after-tax incomes are calculated
for each family, one corresponds to the mother not being in work and the other to
the mother being in work. If there are many children, the only scenario calculated
is one where all the children are treated in a similar way.
Figure A6 shows the employment trend of mothers by the age of the youngest
child. It is evident how the employment rate of mothers increases with the age of
the youngest child. The ﬁgure also shows the share of those receiving a municipal
8where education qualiﬁcation is primary education or the information is missing
9where education qualiﬁcation is secondary education, or post-secondary but not tertiary
10where mothers have an educational qualiﬁcation equivalent to bachelor or higher
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supplement relative to all mothers in the sample by the age of the youngest child.
It is noticeable how the two lines have opposite slopes. A variable for the age of
the youngest child in the estimations captures the correlation of employment of
mothers and the age of the youngest child.
Table A3 shows the mean values, standard deviations and the number of ob-
servations of supplement and employment rate. The table contains statistics of
mothers whose youngest child is between 9 months and 3 years old for selected
years. Table A3 is divided to two parts: the left panel contains everybody in the
sample for the year in question, and the right panel contains only those who live
in a municipality with a supplement policy in place in the year in question. The
second variable from the left, the share receiving supplement, is the share of the
whole sample that lives in a municipality that has the supplement policy. It is
evident that this ﬁgure has increased over time. Over the same time period, the
mean amount of supplement parents are eligible for has changed. The average
monthly supplement is around 200 euros towards the end of the observation pe-
riod. Mothers do not on average have a very high participation rate, and this is
also reﬂected in their low gross incomes. From the right panel it is interesting to
see that the employment rate and the mean earned income have fallen over time
in the group eligible for supplement relative to the whole sample in the left panel.
5 Estimation results
Main results
Table B1 shows the main estimation results. The dependent variables are the
mothers’ labour supply dummy and earned income. The monetary variables (such
as the municipal supplement and earned income) are in 100 euros per month. I
perform all the estimations for fathers as well and ﬁnd zero eﬀect on their labour
supply.
The results in table B1 are organized as follows: there are two panels, top
and bottom, which are divided according to the dependent variable. The top
panel presents the results for the employment dummy, which is coded as 1 if
the earned income is more than half the average income of working-age women.
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In the bottom panel the dependent variable is earned income. In column (i)
there is a plain regression of municipal supplement on the dependent variable.
Column (ii) adds to this individual-level covariates; dummies for the age of the
youngest child for every three age-month intervals, and a number of other control
variables. Column (iii) presents a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences (DD) estimate, including
year and municipal-level dummies and other municipal level control variables. By
controlling for municipal-level diﬀerences, the point estimates become negative
and statistically signiﬁcant. Column (iv) presents the triple diﬀerence results.
The third diﬀerence is between having the youngest child in the age group of 9
months to 2 years or of 3 to 5 years. The latter age group is never entitled to
a supplement or the home-care allowance. An advantage of the triple-diﬀerence
estimate is that it allows controlling for municipality-speciﬁc time trends.
The main result for the work-dummy indicates that increasing the municipal
supplement by 100 euros per month causes 3% fewer mothers to participate. The
main result for income indicates that increasing the municipal supplement by 100
euros per month decreases the annual income by 1100 euros11. Since there is
probably some variation in the way in which mothers respond to the municipal
supplement, I interpret these results as the average treatment eﬀect on the treated.
The participation response implied by the main result is surprisingly large
compared to earlier literature. To put it into context of employment rates and
incomes the participation elasticity is estimated in section 6 below. Potential
reasons for this large participation response are that mothers value their time at
home with small children more than other population groups and that a parent
can return to a job she or he had prior to taking up the home care allowance.
These explanations alter the psychological costs of taking up a job, but they do
not aﬀect the ﬁnancial incentives. Therefore what is measured here is how much
ﬁnancial incentives aﬀect participation decision.
Sensitivity and robustness checks
The result in column (iii) seems to be robust to a quite ﬂexible set of control
variables. As a sensitivity check I tried to include a linear time trend for every
11The average net-of-tax income per month for a woman working full time is around 1500 €
(own calculations).
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municipality, use another deﬁnition for the work dummy12 and exclude some indi-
vidual municipalities or years. Tables C2 and C3 show some of the results. Since
the point estimate does not change much when conditioned on municipal-level
variables, the result does not seem to depend directly on the macroeconomic con-
ditions of the municipality. The coeﬃcient of the supplement is in general quite
robust to controlling for many individual and municipal-level eﬀects. However,
one variable deserves special attention; age of the youngest child. Since this vari-
able is closely correlated with the employment of mothers and the treatment is
not constant within the age of the youngest child, it turns out to be important to
include this covariate, as is done in all applicable estimates.
There are various threats to identifying true average treatment eﬀect on the
treated with the chosen strategy, as discussed in the identiﬁcation section. I per-
form robustness checks in table B2 to check if there is a problem with identiﬁcation.
Column (i) introduces a pseudo-rule that makes mothers whose youngest child is
between 3 to 5 years old eligible for the municipal supplement if they live in a
supplement municipality. The estimates are otherwise similar to those in table
B1, column (ii) for the work-dummy outcome. Families with older children appear
natural candidates for performing a robustness check on, since their characteristics
should otherwise be close to families that just have a little younger child. The zero
result here indicates that a supplement policy does not have a delayed eﬀect on
mothers employment. This is in line with OECD (2007) statistics that indicate
that the employment of mothers with children of this age is much higher than the
employment of mothers with younger children.
Column (ii) of table B2 presents a robustness check for a diﬀerent group:
women who are going to have a child the following year. Here I utilize the ro-
tating panel feature of the data. The model is estimated for families that will have
a child aged 9 months or younger the following year, but do not currently have
any children between 9 months and 3 years old. Thus, they are not yet entitled
to municipal supplement, but live in municipalities that have the policy. This
estimate should tell something about the potential anticipation eﬀect. However,
12The other deﬁnition is the number of months worked as based on a survey question. The
results for this are shown in table C1. There is a measurement error in this variable, thus I did
not use it in the main estimates.
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the coeﬃcient of the supplement is zero. This indicates that there is no serious
anticipation eﬀect (although the sample size is only 541 in this estimate).
Column (iii) of table B2 checks if there is a higher probability of ending up
in the estimation sample associated with changes in a supplement policy. The
outcome is a dummy indicating whether or not a person is a child under three
years old (who are usually those who are entitled to a supplement). This model
is estimated for everyone in the data. The result shows that the supplement
does not have any eﬀect in terms of causing children to end up in the estimation
sample. Thus families with small children do not seem to move to municipalities
oﬀering a supplement13. Moreover, mothers in supplement municipalities do not
seem to be more fertile because of the supplement. Column (iv) presents a base-
line estimation, but with the simpliﬁed rules needed for the implementation of
a supplement used in other robustness checks. The coeﬃcient of the municipal
supplement is similar to main estimates, and the simpliﬁcation of rules does not
seem to aﬀect the estimates.
Divided sample results
To check for possible variation by sub-groups, I divided the sample according to
two dimensions: the mother’s education and the number of children in a family.
These characteristics are determined ﬁrst and the participation decision is made
later. Thus dividing the sample along these dimensions should not be correlated
with treatment eﬀects. The results are shown in table B3. The dependent variables
are again the mothers’ labour supply dummy in the top panel and earned income
in the bottom panel. The supplement is measured in 100 euros per month.
The divided sample results by education suggest there is an u-shape in response
proﬁle: low-educated respond more than medium-educated and the high-educated
respond the most. The same overall picture in both cases, although the earned
income coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcant for low-educated group14. It is surprising that
for the high education group the coeﬃcient is larger than for the medium educa-
13Finnish municipalities are typically large in surface area. Thus, moving to another munici-
pality usually means moving to a completely diﬀerent city or town.
14For participation essentially the same set of results came out when the participation threshold
was deﬁned as 30 % of mean income of the education group.
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tion group. This is surprising because education is usually highly correlated with
incomes, which ﬁgure A5 conﬁrms in the present case. The interpretation of the
result is that mothers who have high income potential respond more to changes in
taxation than mothers who have medium income potential.
There are possible explanations for this that are not directly related to income
potential. Some of the mothers in medium income group could still be doing their
studies in the university. Thus they would not respond by returning to a job in
any case. This explanation is not likely to be the whole story, since the average age
of a mother in the sample is 32 and a typical student is much younger. Moreover
the typical education ﬁeld in medium education group is practical education that
is not directly applicable to university studies. Other explanation is that mothers
in high education group have more secure job where they can return to. They
then would feel secure to return to that job later and spend the two years at home
with a child. The hypothesis goes on by stating that this would not be possible for
women in medium education group with less secure and perhaps even temporary
jobs. Again this seems unlikely to be the whole explanation, since for example
medical nurses are in the middle education group and often have secure public
sector jobs in Finland.
In the previous literature, there are very few attempts to estimate labour supply
responses of higher income or education individuals. Eissa (1995) studied labour
supply eﬀects of The Tax Reform Act of 1986 in 99th income percentile married
women. She found overall labour supply elasticity of 0.8. Eissa and Liebman
(1996) found a larger estimate for their lower education group than for higher
education group. The reform analysed by Eissa and Liebman was Earned Income
Tax Credit (EITC) reform targeted to working poor. These type of reforms that
depend on income tax schedule always aﬀect speciﬁc part of the income distribution
more than other parts. The municipal supplement analysed here is based on the
municipality a mother lives in. Moreover it does not depend on income prior to
having the child. Consequently, the amount one is eligible for does not depend
on the education one has. The supplement thus provides a good way to analyse
participation responses across education levels.
The result that mothers having higher income earning capability respond more
than those having medium earning capability is surprising, since in the literature
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the opposite is often assumed (Saez 2002 and Eissa et al. 2008). In the literature
on optimal income taxes with an extensive margin of labour supply it is usually
assumed that the poor have higher participation elasticity than the rich (see e.g.
Saez 2002 and Immervoll et al. 2007). This assumption is usually made when
simulating the welfare eﬀects of a tax reform across income distribution. This is
partly what I ﬁnd, but as an addition there is the higher participation elasticity
for higher educated mothers.
It is also interesting that the result is much stronger for families with 1 or 2
children (coeﬃcient is more signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero) and the coeﬃcient
for larger families, although non-signiﬁcant, is actually positive. The result for
parents with three or more children should be interpreted with caution since there
are not that many of them. Even so, this result is interesting because it implies
that the participation elasticity proﬁle is essentially non-linear in the number of
children.
6 Participation elasticity
It is important to put the eﬀect of a supplement on labour supply in a policy-
relevant context. This can be done by using the participation elasticity. The idea
is to put the participation eﬀect into the context of prevailing employment rates
and beneﬁt and income levels. Furthermore, optimal income tax models that take
the extensive margin into account, employ an inverse elasticity rule that uses the
inverse of the participation elasticity (Saez 2002).
To estimate the participation elasticity, I need to calculate the net after-tax
income associated with participation for everybody. For this, I need to know two
income numbers for every mother. One measures after-tax income when not being
in work (and taking care of the children) and the other measures after-tax income
when being in work (and placing the children into public day care). The income
measures used in the analysis corresponding to each choice are shown in equations
(1) and (2). The net after-tax income is calculated by taking the diﬀerence of
these two measures. I need to make assumptions to be able to calculate these
measures, and one of them is that the two choices mentioned above are the only
ones available to mothers in respect of taking care of their children.
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Only one of the two incomes is always observed in any data. A typical so-
lution to this is to simulate the two income measures for everybody based on
pre-determined characteristics. I use incomes of those in work to predict incomes
for every parent based on observable characteristics including age, education and
gender.
The diﬀerence in these would itself suﬀer from an endogeneity problem. There-
fore I use the municipal supplement as an instrument for the change in after-tax
incomes associated with participation. The various robustness checks presented in
the previous section contribute to validating the use of this instrument. To be a
good instrument, the municipal supplement should aﬀect exogenously the incen-
tives to supply labour. On the other hand, it should directly aﬀect the income one
gets when the change in participation status is made. The coeﬃcient are expected
to have a positive sign because the subsidies enter the income equation with a
negative sign.
The results are shown in table B4. The explanatory variable is a dummy for
participation status as in the main estimates. Now the unit of measurement is
1 euro per year. The ﬁrst stage, shown in the ﬁrst line, is very strong. There
is almost a one-to-one relationship between change in incomes and the amount of
supplement one is eligible for. The second stage results from 2SLS suggest that the
amount mothers gain when they participate leads to an increase in participation
probability of .003 % for each additional euro per year.
The participation elasticity (η) implied by the coeﬃcient in the table B4 can
be calculated as
η = dparticipation
dincome
∗ income
participation
=
β ∗ income
participation
= 0.0000295∗((9814)/(0.348)) = 0.83
where β refers to the coeﬃcient of income in the second stage regression. The
above elasticity is calculated on an annual basis. The 9814 euros, the income,
is the average change in net income associated with labour market entry for a
typical mother. The 0.348, the participation, is the average participation rate in
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the population for which the estimation was made.
Table B5 shows the participation eﬀect by education level. The result is
signiﬁcant for mothers with low or missing education and for mothers with a
bachelor degree or higher. The participation elasticities implied by these esti-
mates for low, medium and high education levels are 0.000038 ∗ (7050/0.2) = 1.3,
0.000017∗(8060/0.35) = 0.4 and 0.000038∗(17470/0.44) = 1.5, respectively. These
participation elasticities conﬁrm the u-shape proﬁle of participation elasticities by
education suggested by the reduced-form divided sample results. Higher educated
respond to ﬁnancial incentives more than medium educated even when accounting
for their higher than average income.
The estimate is performed more structurally here than in other studies analysing
child-care beneﬁts and prices (Baker et al. (2008) and Milligan and Stabile (2007)).
Here the change in net after-tax income associated with entry is taken explicitly
into account. This is possible since supplements do not directly depend on income.
To report some earlier estimates in the literature, Baker et al. (2008) estimated
a participation elasticity of 0.236 resulting from decreasing child-care cost, and
Milligan and Stabile (2007) reported an elasticity of 0.96 for having earnings as a
major source of income utilising the Canadian beneﬁt reform. Eissa and Liebman
(1996) estimated a participation elasticity of 0.6 for single mothers.
7 Policy implications
This section presents crude calculations of the economic implications of supple-
ment policies. Based on the estimates in this paper and aggregate municipal-level
statistics, it is possible to look at how desirable a supplement policy is from the
municipal point of view and the total economy point of view. To be able to fully
assess the optimality of the policy, I would need an estimate of the welfare of
individuals and the eﬀects of the policy on other groups, most notably children.
I need to make certain assumptions to be able to calculate all the ﬁgures rele-
vant for these estimates on the eﬀectiveness of the policy analysed. I only present
results for mothers. This is justiﬁed because I ﬁnd that fathers do not often take
up supplements and that the estimated labour supply eﬀect for them is zero. I
assume that the children are put in public day care in the cases where the mother
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works, which is the prevalent choice in Finland. I need to calculate the eﬀect on
an average mother. To this end, based on my own calculations from the data, I
assume that a mother has 1,4 children, has a spouse who is in work, earns 1600
euros per month before taxes when working full- or part-time and faces municipal
and national income tax rates of 16 per cent and 25 per cent respectively.
I compare the situations where a mother is in work and where she is not in
work from a public sector expenditure point of view. If a mother works, she pays
on average 500 euros in taxes and 280 euros per 1.4 children in day care fees per
month. But, the total cost per child in day care is 1300 euros per month15. If the
mother does not work, she receives 300 euros in home-care allowance per month.
Summing these rough estimates (500+280-1300 = - 522 euros compared to -300
euros), it seems that without a municipal supplement it is less costly for the public
sector if the mother does not work. This result is driven mainly by the high cost
of public day care. Naturally, these calculations would look diﬀerent if the longer-
term eﬀects were taken into account. Then lost pension savings and the eﬀects of
deteriorating working skills would be taken into account.
It might not be optimal for the municipality to provide a supplement. Even
with a fairly large participation elasticity estimate, the costs of increasing a sup-
plement with the current participation rates are larger than the gains, because the
supplement is paid to every child in eligible group, not only for those switching
their care status.
This can be seen from a simple example. Assume there are 1000 mothers in
a municipality, of whom 355 work and the rest are taking care of their children.
Increasing the home-care allowance by 100 euros per month via a supplement
would induce 33 more mothers to stay at home. The amount of public funds
saved from day-care costs is 33*(1300-280)=33,660 euros. At the same time, the
municipality would need to pay the supplement to every mother already staying
at home and to those the new policy induced to stay there. The cost of the new
policy is then 688*100=68,800 euros. Thus this rough example shows quite clearly
that municipalities lose out in reforms introducing a supplement to the home-care
allowance, even if lost tax revenues are not accounted for.
15This ﬁgure came from own calculations from municipal-level database ALTIKA provided by
Statistics Finland.
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8 Conclusion
This paper presents evidence on the extent to which child-care beneﬁts aﬀect the
maternal labour supply. An important component of this study is a particular
feature of the Finnish child-care system: a municipal supplement to the child
home-care allowance. This provides plausibly exogenous variation to the labour
supply incentives of mothers.
To be entitled to a municipal supplement a parent needs to stay at home
taking care of children, the children must be below a speciﬁed age limit and live
in a municipality that has the policy in place. Because of regional policy reforms,
the control group and the treatment group consist of very similar mothers. The
municipalities changed their policies many times during the observation period.
I found that a municipal supplement to the home-care allowance has a negative
eﬀect on the labour supply decision of mothers. The main estimate indicated that
increasing a municipal supplement by 100 euros per month causes 3 per cent fewer
women to participate. I did not ﬁnd any eﬀect on the labour supply of fathers.
The results also show that when the home-care allowance period ends, mothers
return to employment. Thus the policy does not seem to have a delayed eﬀect on
employment.
To put the results into a policy context, I estimated the participation elasticity.
In the estimation the eﬀect of changes in incomes associated with entry was re-
gressed on the probability of entering the labour force. The municipal supplement
was used as an instrument of the changes in incomes. It is a good instrument,
since it clearly aﬀects the changes in incomes when entering the labour market.
At the same time prior analysis has established that supplements are exogenous
to labour supply incentives. The result implies a participation elasticity of around
0.8. This estimate is towards the high end of the elasticities found in other studies
for the population as a whole. It thus supports the view that the participation
response is larger for mothers than for the rest of the population (Blundell and
Macurdy 1999).
An attractive feature of the home care allowance analysed here is that it allows
to estimate directly how much ﬁnancial incentives aﬀect labour participation, not
only a feature that is correlated with ﬁnancial incentives. Moreover the ﬁnancial
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incentives of every mother, regardless of their education, is altered in a similar way.
It is therefore surprising to ﬁnd a larger eﬀect for those with higher education than
for those with medium education. This result is something that earlier literature
has not produced, perhaps due to lack of suitable variation in incentives for every
education and income level.
When education is taken as a proxy for income, one would expect that those
with higher earnings potential (high education) would be less responsive to the
same monetary incentives than those with lower earnings potential (low education).
In studies where the eﬀects of a tax reform are simulated, it is assumed that a
participation elasticity proﬁle is declining in income (e.g. Saez 2002 and Immervoll
et al. 2007). The result obtained in this study implies that the participation
response may, at least in population of mothers, ﬁrst decline in income, but then
increase again towards the high end of the income distribution. Since for example
the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is targeted towards the working poor, this
ﬁnding may have implications regarding the optimality of an EITC-type reform.
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A Appendix Tables and Figures
All the tables and ﬁgures are in this appendix.
Figure A1: The employment rate of mothers by the age of the youngest child.
Source: OECD (2007).
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Figure A2: Maps of Finland showing municipalities having a supplement policy in
selected years
Note: The above maps of Finland show municipalities with a supplement policy marked
in black. The maps correspond to the situations in 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2005 respec-
tively.
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Figure A3: Map showing the population of each municipality in 2005
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Figure A4: Leads and lags of regression coeﬃcients when a supplement to home
care allowance was implemented in a municipality. 4 diﬀerent dependent variables.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARS Supplem. CareCost Priv.care Homecare Empl Migrate
implem.-2 -0.95*** 0.017 -0.068 0.0033 0.0065** -0.005
(0.08) (0.022) (0.069) (0.013) (0.0033) (0.028)
implem.-1 -1.06*** 0.018 -0.103 -0.0084 0.0069** -0.015
(0.08) (0.022) (0.069) (0.013) (0.0033) (0.031)
implem. 2.56*** 0.005 -0.07 6.6e-05 0.0109*** -0.023
(0.08) (0.021) (0.07) (0.013) (0.0034) (0.036)
implem.+1 3.14*** -0.004 -0.162** 0.0244* 0.0076* -0.021
(0.1) (0.022) (0.079) (0.0145) (0.004) (0.036)
implem.+2 2.54*** 0.014 -0.039 0.0182 0.0066 -0.042
(0.11) (0.025) (0.086) (0.0157) (0.0044) (0.041)
Constant -5.96*** 5.22*** -3.86*** -1.17*** 3.58*** 3.34***
(0.51) (0.13) (0.55) (0.1) (0.00) (0.187)
N 4057 4173 3406 3406 4494 3430
R2 0.49 0.18 0.06 0.64 0.8 0.26
N of Mun 290 321 319 319 321 312
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A1: Leads and lags of municipality implementing the supplement
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Figure A5: The distribution of earned incomes divided by education in a group of
mothers whose youngest child is between 9 months and 3 years old
Youngest child Youngest child
9 mon. to 2 yo. 3 to 7 yo.
Mean Sd Mean Sd
Number of obs. 5709 8411
Age 32.09 (5.26) 36.24 (5.40)
Earned income 7726 (10510) 14983 (12979)
Employment rate 0.35 (0.48) 0.65 (0.48)
Education N/A 0.11 0.12
Basic education 0.42 0.43
Higher education 0.26 0.26
Bachelor or higher 0.21 0.18
N of children under 7 1.65 (0.70) 1.24 (0.45)
Table A2: Descriptive statistics
Note: Mean and standard deviations of the descriptive statistics. In the left panel the youngest
child is between 10 months and 3 years of age and in the right panel the youngest child is between
3 and 7 years of age.
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Figure A6: Employment rate of mothers by the age of youngest child and propor-
tion receiving a supplement.
All Conditional on
eligibility for supplement
Year Share Employ- Earned N Supple- Employ- Earned N
receives ment income ment ment income
supplement rate rate
1995 0.06 0.36 6305 761 120 0.46 7881 46
0.24 0.48 8294 30 0.50 9754
1997 0.12 0.42 8244 761 185 0.40 7448 91
0.32 0.49 10016 71 0.49 8102
1999 0.17 0.37 7941 693 206 0.39 8491 116
0.37 0.48 10306 83 0.49 9997
2001 0.20 0.39 8932 713 212 0.35 7216 145
0.40 0.49 10554 76 0.48 8906
2003 0.20 0.37 9452 667 204 0.30 9029 132
0.40 0.48 12735 67 0.46 14672
2005 0.23 0.36 9466 638 190 0.32 7453 144
0.42 0.48 11989 75 0.47 9374
Table A3: Outcome and treatment variables
Note: The left panel contains all observations for the selected years and the right panel only
those who are eligible for a supplement in that year. The standard deviations are given in italics
below the mean values.
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B Estimation Results
Outcome Coeﬃcient (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
OLS OLS DD DDD
Work Supplement -0.01 0.006 -0.033*** -0.036***
(0.011) (0.007) (0.010) (0.013)
Obs 5,709 5,709 5,709 11,205
R-sq 0.000 0.117 0.205 0.432
Income Supplement 275 269** -939*** -1,108***
(320) (123) (254) (388.0)
Obs 5,725 5,725 5,725 11,287
R-sq 0.001 0.245 0.313 0.490
Indiv. controls No Yes Yes Yes
Years No No Yes Yes
Municipalities No No Yes Yes
2nd level interactions No No No Yes
Standard errors in parentheses (clustered on municipal level)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table B1: The main estimation results
Note: OLS estimates for a population of mothers. In the top panel, the dependent variable is
the labour supply dummy of mothers. In the bottom panel, the dependent variable is earned
income of mothers. The supplement is measured in 100 euros per month. Column (i) is a plain
regression of the supplement on the dependent variables and column (ii) adds to this individual
level covariates. Column (iii) shows the DD results and column (iv) presents the triple diﬀerence
results. The third diﬀerence is between whether or not the youngest child is older than 3 years
of age. Individual covariates used: age, education, spouse’s income, number of children, the
size of household and indicators for each 3 month intervals of children’s age. Municipal-level
covariates used: municipal income tax rate, municipal unemployment rate, average income in
municipality, average number of places in public child day care relative to the number of children
in municipality.
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(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
3-5 yo. Next year Prob. Main
child child in sample estimate
Supple- 0.0129 0.0149 -2.83e-06 -0.0316***
ment (0.0136) (0.0509) (1.41e-05) (0.0101)
Obs. 4722 541 217837 5877
R2 0.219 0.548 0.057 0.259
Years Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipalities Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses(clustered on municipal level)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table B2: Robustness checks
Note: The dependent variable in columns (i), (ii) and (iv) is the mother’s labour supply dummy
and in column (iii) it is an indicator with the value of 1 for children under the age of 3 as a
dependent variable. The estimation sample in column (i) is mothers whose youngest child is
between 3 and 5 years old and in column (ii) women who will have a child next year. Column
(iii) is estimated for everyone in the data. Column (iv) shows the main result, but with simpliﬁed
supplement rules.
Participation
First -1.037***
stage (0.0341)
F-value 925.44
Change in -2.95e-05***
incomes (8.85e-06)
Obs. 5876
R2 0.191
Elasticity 0.83
Standard errors in parentheses
(clustered on municipal level)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table B4: Change in mothers participation in response to change in incomes
Note: 2SLS results for the mothers’ participation dummy. The ﬁrst stage regresses municipal
supplement on change in incomes associated with entry. The second stage explains the partici-
pation dummy with the ﬁrst-stage predicted value.
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(i) (ii) (iii)
Low educ. Med. educ. High educ.
First -1.081*** -1.037*** -1.113***
stage (0.103) (0.026) (0.042)
F-value 110.8 1650 706.5
Change in -3.78e-05* -1.72e-05 -3.81e-05***
incomes (2.16e-05) (1.12e-05) (1.48e-05)
Obs. 696 3977 1203
R2 0.439 0.212 0.357
Elasticity 1.3 0.4 1.5
Standard errors in parentheses(clustered on municipal level)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table B5: Participation response by mothers education
Note: 2SLS results for the mothers’ participation dummy divided by their education level. Col-
umn (i) shows results with basic education or whom education information was not available, in
column (ii) the highest degree attained is high school or equivalent and in column (iii) bachelor
level or higher. Change in incomes and other monetary values measured in euros per year.
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C Robustness and sensitivity checks
Table C1 reports estimates based on an outcome variable where mothers have
reported working 10 or more months in an interview. Column (iii) reports a DD
estimate equivalent to the main estimates. Although the coeﬃcient is smaller, it
implies a similar participation elasticity, since the participation elasticity measured
in this way is smaller than in normal estimates.
(i) (ii) (iii)
Supplement -0.0548*** -0.0843*** -0.0140*
(0.00616) (0.00958) (0.00827)
Years No Yes Yes
Municipalities No Yes Yes
Child age No Yes
Obs. 6023 6023 6023
R2 0.013 0.139 0.273
Standard errors in parentheses(clustered on municipal level)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table C1: Estimations with work dummy based on survey question
Note: OLS estimates for the mothers’ labour supply dummy with a value of 1 when reported
working 10 or more months per year in a survey. Supplement measured in 100 euros per month.
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Outcome Coeﬃcient (i) (ii)
Work Supplement 0.0026 0.0043
(0.0093) (0.0095)
Obs. 5527 5527
R2 0.197 0.224
Income Supplement 244 -91
(279) (262)
Obs. 5560 5560
R2 0.366 0.387
Standard errors in parentheses(clustered on municipal level)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table C3: Sensitivity check: results for fathers
Note: OLS estimates for fathers’ labour supply dummy and earned income. Supplement mea-
sured in 100 euros per month. Column (i) is similar to the main DD estimates for mothers.
Column (ii) adds linear municipality trends to this.
Outcome Var (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Partici- Supple- -0.026* -0.042** -0.026* -0.030** -0.036*** -0.027***
pation ment (0.013) (0.021) (0.013) (0.013) (0.0094) (0.010)
Obs. 5,709 3,572 4,493 5,273 5,709 5,709
R2 0.225 0.245 0.223 0.206 0.206 0.203
Income Supple- -974*** -1,133*** -861** -693***
ment (342) (423) (361) (233)
Obs. 5,725 3,581 4,506 5,289
R2 0.325 0.350 0.321 0.313
Standard errors in parentheses(clustered on municipal level)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table C2: Sensitivity checks
Note: OLS estimates for the mothers’ labour supply dummy and earned income. Supplement
measured in 100 euros per month. Column (i) includes linear municipal trends where some
smaller municipalities were grouped together. Column (ii) includes only years from 1995 to 2001
and column (iii) only years from 1998 to 2005. Column (iv) leaves out the largest municipality
in the sample. Column (v) sets the employment threshold to 70 per cent of the mean income
and column (vi) sets the threshold to 30 per cent of the mean income.
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